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BOOK REVIEW:
THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE AND
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION
Authored By: DeboraL. Spar*
In The Baby Business, Debora Spar argues that it is time to
acknowledge the commercial truth about reproduction and to establish
a standard that governs its transactions. In this fascinating behind-thescenes account, she combines pioneering research and interviews with
the industry's top reproductive scientists and trailblazers to provide a
first glimpse at how the industry works: who the baby makers are, who
makes money, how prices are set, and what defines the clientele.
Fascinating stories illustrate the inner workings of market segments-including stem cell research, surrogacy, egg swapping, "designer
babies," adoption, and human cloning-as Spar explores the moral and
legal challenges that industry players must address. The first purely
commercial look at an industry that deals in humanity's most intimate
issues, this book challenges us to consider the financial promise and
ethical perils we'll face as the baby business moves inevitably forward.
Reviewed By: Mary L. Shanley**
I first learned of the publication of Debora Spar's book, The Baby
Business,1 while listening to the radio. Although I cannot remember the
exact program, I recall an excited commentator hailing this book in
which a professor at the Harvard Business School used her professional
expertise to overturn the common opinion that the family and the
market belong to two quite distinct realms. Listeners would be
astonished and distressed to learn, he said, that there is "commerce of
conception." I subsequently heard and read in public media similar
* Debora L. Spar is the Spangler Family Professor at Harvard Business School, where

she works on issues of business-government relations and the political environment of
international commerce. At Harvard, Dr. Spar is Senior Associate Dean, Director of
Research and the chair of Making Markets Work, an executive education program
devoted to public and private sector leaders in Africa.
** Mary L. Shanley, Ph.D., is a Professor of Political Science on the Margaret Stiles
Halleck Chair at Vassar College.
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expressions of surprise at Spar's findings, and these reactions show
how badly needed and useful this book is. While those working in the
field of reproductive technologies, law and bioethics have been aware
of the trade in human gametes and gestational service, the shock with
which many commentators greeted Spar's book indicates that the
general public has not known the degree to which use of reproductive
technologies is a largely unregulated market.
Tremendously useful as a demonstration of the ways and the
extent to which eggs, sperm, gestational services and children available
for adoption are part of a baby market, and a valuable and much-needed
call for government regulation of that market, the book is less
satisfying in clarifying the principles-both economic and moral-that
should guide such regulation. On the one hand, Spar affirms the
usefulness of the commerce of conception, deems it a "good thing," and
calls for rigorous public discussion to decide upon desirable
regulations. On the other hand, her discussions of particular practices
and policies indicate that she has reservations about the market's ability
to serve the values of human dignity and equal citizenship. Her
endorsement of a "mixed regime" of a partially free and a partially
regulated market cries out for her thoughts concerning which activities
belong in which category, and why, and which aspects of human
reproduction should be kept outside the market entirely. Once these
matters are clarified, then one can proceed to the public discussion of
specific regulations that Spar hopes to inspire. The lack of clarity
arises, I think, from an unresolved ambivalence on Spar's part about the
adequacy of the market. If she could clearly articulate that
ambivalence, she could more readily identify the principles that are at
stake in the debates she calls for, and strengthen the important
contribution her work will make to those critical deliberations.
I.

ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE AND EXTENT OF
THE BABY MARKET

Spar begins her book with admirable clarity: "despite popular protests
to the contrary, and despite the heartfelt sentiments of parents and
providers, there is a flourishing market for both children and their
component parts The Baby Business does not insist that this market is
either good or evil. It simply argues that it exists.",2 True to her
promise, Spar does an excellent job of revealing the multitudinous
2 Id. at

xv.
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ways in which both adoption and use of new reproductive technologies
are markets. Rejecting the view that procreation using market
mechanisms is morally unacceptable, she concludes that given the
inevitability of a baby market, government needs to develop 3 "a
regulatory framework in which the business of babies can proceed.",
To get people to recognize the unequivocally market nature of
various transactions by which people are forming families, Spar lays
out the dimensions of the baby market-indeed some might call it the
baby industry-clearly and authoritatively. She describes the market in
gametes (that is, sperm and eggs) and embryos, pointing out that
treatments for infertility range from moderately costly to very
expensive. In 2003, the cost of a single cycle of in vitro fertilization
(IVF) was $12,400, placing it out of reach of the average family. Some
people purchase not only genetic material, but also gestational services,
which cost between $10,000 and $30,000, and are regulated by vastly
different regulatory schemes in various states (from California's
acceptance to Michigan's prohibition). As Spar points out, people can
now purchase genetic material, create an embryo using IVF, and hire a
woman to gestate the fetus, thereby involving markets in both goods
and labor.
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), a technique that
increases potential parents' control over the attributes of their future
child, creates a market for a procedure that some say should be banned,
at least when used... for enhancement rather than avoidance of disease
or disability; and, when cloning becomes possible, the question of the
propriety of the selection of genetic traits will become more acute.
While sympathetic to the kinds of situations that might lead some
people to seek to use technology to select the traits of their offspring
(for example, creating a sibling who could be a compatible donor for a
deathly ill child), Spar is aware that such choices "carry social costs."
She insists that "society must have some say in how these choices are
made and the extent to which they are left to private preferences and
market forces." 4 But she is uncomfortable with the prospect both of sex
selection and with "savior siblings" and of restrictions on the market;
and, so she hopes that "even rich parents" will abjure the market and
decide "to let nature take its course," trusting in their gene pool,
openness to the unbidden, or the ease and pleasure of sexual
procreation. It is a hope that conveys Spar's sound values, but it fails to
3 Id. at
4Id. at

xix.
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identify the principles that should inform the public debate she regards
as crucial for setting public policy.
II.

SPAR'S CASE FOR REGULATION OF THE BABY
MARKET

Contrary to her claim at the beginning of the book that she is not
concerned with whether the baby market is good or evil, but only to
demonstrate that it exists, Spar does have a normative position. She
regards a baby market as a good thing: it provides mechanisms by
which orphaned, abandoned, or neglected children can find homes
through adoption, and it provides people who want children with the
option of using third-party genetic material to help them create a child
that they will raise: "the baby business.

. .

produces a good that is

5
inherently good. It produces children, for people who want them.",
Instead of denouncing the market, we should examine "how market
mechanisms might help produce a socially desirable outcome." 6 But in
the absence of any regulation, "supply will flourish, but only the rich
will enjoy its benefits;",7 the world will be divided into two classes, the
GenRich and the GenPoor, (rather like the world of the film, Gattica), a
situation Spar finds unacceptable on egalitarian grounds.
So the market is a good thing, but only if we fix certain aspects
of the market, and only if it is properly regulated. By "fixing" the
market Spar means clarifying the property rights involved in the baby
business. And by proper regulation, she means policy based on a
mixture of four kinds of regulatory approaches. These two propositions
are at the heart of her analysis about regulation, and deserve careful
consideration.
Spar believes that treating sperm, eggs, and wombs as property
would bring desirable predictability and transparency to thorny issues
that arise with assisted reproduction. She mentions the case of a man
who sued an infertility clinic for implanting an embryo created with his
sperm in his ex-wife's womb without his permission; the case of two
sets of parents who had made payment to adopt twin girls through a
transaction conducted over the internet; and a couple who sued a clinic
for disposing of embryos that had been in storage for five years. These
cases clearly suggest the need for principles that should guide their

'Id. at 196.
6id.
7

1d. at 223.
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resolution and those of future cases (which hopefully will be few and
far between). But predictability and transparency could also be
achieved by clear regulations; much present confusion arises from the
fact that the law varies from state to state and that many courts must
decide such cases in the absence of any statutory guidance. Treating
gametes and embryos as property also raises the question of whether
the law should allow differential pricing, letting the market set the price
(for example, putting a premium on the gametes of those with high
SAT scores). It is not clear that resolving some disputes by treating
gametes as property will not bring with it other problems involving the
commodification about which Spar has expressed reservations.
Spar may be right that treating gametes and embryos as
property is the way to lend transparency and predictability to
transactions and to insure that the supply of gametes meets the demand,
but two other parts of her text seem to work against this conclusion or
at least to call out for more detailed analysis. The first is her discussion
of adoption. One of the best and most interesting aspects of Spar's book
is her insistence that both adoption and the world of reproductive
technologies are subject to market mechanisms- indeed, that they are
part of a unified market. Despite the fact that uses of and access to
reproductive technologies are in the hands of the medical profession,
and adoption is facilitated by social workers and so appear to involve
two different realms of human activity, the goals of each are the same.
What people seek in acquiring eggs, sperm, embryos, gestational
services, or adoptive children is the ability to form a family
relationship; adoption and the use of reproductive technologies are
alternative means to form a parent-child relationship. If there is a
significant cost difference between forming a family through use of
reproductive technologies or adoption, price will influence all but the
rich in choosing one means or the other.
Spar contends that "theoretically ...all these various would-be

children are nearly perfect substitutes for one another." 8 So why not
allow the sale of children? Because nearly everyone agrees that human
beings should not be bought and sold; by contrast, "in assisted
reproduction, the parent is purchasing the potential of a child," not the
child itself.9 But this distinction does not in and of itself decide the
question of whether gametes and embryos should be thought of as
property, and whether there should be an open market and differential
8Id. at xvi.
9 Id. at 160.
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pricing of gametes. What is at stake, and what is gained and lost, by
saying "gametes are the property of the person who produces them and
who therefore has rights of ownership" and saying "gametes are not
properly thought of as personal property because they are components
of human life"? The first formulation would open the way to arguing
about price regulation of commodities, and policy might or might not
curtail an open market. The second formulation would open the way to
discussions of whether donors could properly be paid for undergoing
the procedures involved in gamete donation but not for the gametes
themselves, a stipulation that would produce more uniform costs and
remuneration. These questions do not come from those who would
banish the market in gametes, but rather arise from Spar's important
insight that we must understand adoption and reproductive technologies
as two integrally related facets of the project of creating families, and
the reader longs to have her guidance as to what is at stake in each
position
And then there is the matter of race. As Spar points out, in
2002, thirty-seven percent of the children in US foster care were
African American, and "historically, the demand for these children has
been stunted," first by social workers reluctant to place children across
racial lines, and then by parents' perception that these were children
with special needs.' 0 While measures that prohibit race-matching and
shorten the time that the state is permitted to keep children in foster
care may mean "that the market in this area could well increase over
time," Spar's understanding that adoption and reproductive
technologies are two segments of the same market suggests other
issues. One of the reasons that parents turn to fertility clinics and
purchase gametes rather than pursue adoption is their desire to raise a
child of the same race as themselves. They may do this because they
want their children to look roughly like themselves, or because they do
not want to raise an older child (in 2002, 73 percent of the children in
foster care were over the age of five). For white parents, there is the
additional knowledge that whiteness carries with it a plethora of social
and economic advantages. Spar is well aware of these social facts and
talks about how they structure the adoption market both in the US and
internationally. Although Spar points out that there is a danger that
adoption will become the mode of family formation for the poor who
cannot conceive a child while the rich turn to reproductive
technologies, she does not similarly address the possibility that
l 0 ld. at

177.
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reproductive technologies will be a way of replicating white privilege.
Her analysis only implicitly raises the question of whether the public
interest in racial equality justifies regulation of gamete transfer or
adoptions-or both.
Another insightful, important and under-developed point is
Spar's assertion that the ability to form family ties and raise children
implicates notions of equity and of equal citizenship. As a society we
value babies and the happiness they can bring, and therefore "We treat
them, not as rights per se, but at least as something to which all citizens
have a nearly identical claim. How then, can we say that some people
can procreate for free, whereas others must pay? And how can we
permit such significant variation . . . between different versions of

assisted procreation?" ' " Spar does not spell out the exact contours of
what equity would entail, but she repeatedly suggests that equal
standing as citizens necessitates fair distribution of "a chance at
parenthood ' ' 12 as part of the common good.
The notion that family relationships are a good that should not
simply be relegated to the private realm underlies Spar's discussion of
four models that govern various kinds of exchanges, the "spectrum of
options" among which we might choose in deciding how to regulate the
baby business. The first is the luxury model, in which we would "treat
the acquisition of children like the purchase of fine jewelry." 13 Under
this model, those who could afford to purchase gametes or gestational
services or to pay the costs associated with adoption would do so, and
those unable to do so would be out of luck. There would be no reason
to worry about access or equity, because the chance to raise children
would be thought of as analogous to the possession of a luxury item.
The second model is prohibition, which Spar analogizes to the cocaine
and heroin trades. The law would forbid the acquisition of gametes and
babies, and drive the trade underground. The third model would have
us "treat babies, and the components of babies, the way we treat
kidneys."' 14 Organ donation is based on what economists call a
"hierarchy" rather than a market, that is, the good to be exchanged is
distributed on the basis of criteria other than money, such as acuteness
of need, the degree of match between recipient and donor, or time
waiting in the queue. The problem with this model, in Spar's view, is
that donations are unlikely to meet demand; many people desiring to
" Id. at 214.

Id. at 227.
"3Id. at 217.
12

14

Id. at 219.
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become parents will not be able to acquire the eggs or sperm or
gestational service that they need. The fourth model is the hip
replacement model. Spar points out that in the US "if we left hip
replacement to the free market, . . . rich people who needed hip

replacements would probably get them, and poorer persons would not."
Society finds this inequality unacceptable, and so we treat replacement
hips as a form of a social good that the market cannot distribute
equitably. Equity matters because whether one's hip degenerates is
beyond one's control, and the difference in the quality of life available
to those who can and cannot afford to replace hips is enormous.
The hip replacement model is very attractive to Spar both
because it would not cut off use of reproductive technologies and
would make considerations of equality and equal access of central
importance: "Conceptually, such a model would work ... well in the

baby trade. All we would need to do, really, is to define infertility as a
medical condition, and then subject it to the same kind of coverage now
afforded other medical procedures."' 5 We would treat the baby trade
"as a niche of modern medicine.' 16 The problem with this approach, as
Spar sees it, is that there are objective criteria that indicate when
someone needs a hip, and almost no one argues that society should not
meet the need. With reproductive technologies, however, people differ
in their opinions about whether the desire for children is one that
society should try to meet, and there are bitter disputes about such
matters as whether single persons, same-sex couples, and postmenopausal women should be able to use the technologies.
There is also the problem, as Spar has earlier argued, that we
should not deal with reproductive technologies exclusively as medical
procedures, but rather as instruments of family formation. So the claim
would not simply be a claim to equitable distribution of medical
treatments, but rather to equal opportunity to attempt to form a family.
And at stake is not simply the public good of having and raising
children, but equal dignity and respect for the family aspirations, and
the families, of a diverse and pluralistic population.
The only way to deal with the differences of opinion that
surround the issues that have arisen with respect to the proper uses of
reproductive technologies, says Spar, is "to acknowledge the market
that reproductive technologies have created, and then figure out how to
channel this market to our own best interests.' 7 It would usually be at
"5Id.at 221.
16 Id

17Id. at

231.
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this point in "any provocative book where the author lays out a road
'8
map for reform," says Spar. "But this author is not going to do that."'
Why? Because "markets [are] political as well as commercial entities,"
and as political entities "any top-down strategy of reform" is certain to
fail. What the market needs instead "is a politically determined
strategy, one that emerges from a dedicated and explicitly political
19
debate.'
The agnosticism that permeates these passages is confusing,
however, because Spar has in the course of the book made insightful
judgments that while not dictating the details of policies to regulate the
baby business, would set parameters to any future discussion. At a
number of points she indicates that she thinks that various public goods
are involved in or relevant to the baby business. Her insistence that
adoption and reproductive technologies should be treated as part of a
single market stems from her belief that having and raising children is a
good for individuals and for society. The reason to make access to
reproductive technologies available to people at all income levels is
that the opportunity to parent children is as central to some people's
quality of life as being free from chronic pain or being able to walk and
should be as accessible to all as education, health care, and clean water.
A reader understandably wants to know what aspects of human
reproduction and family formation Spar regards as public goods--or
human rights-and how her judgment about this sets parameters to
those aspects of the baby business she would leave to be resolved by
the market.
I do not want to slight the book in my hands because it is not
the one I wish Spar had written. The Baby Business achieves Spar's
goal of documenting the ways in which and the degree to which there is
a thriving baby market both in the US and internationally, and her
analysis of this market is both impressive and valuable. In addition, the
book is accessible and clearly written, and contains a wealth of useful
and accurate information. Indeed, the footnotes contain an extensive
and evenhanded guide to the scholarly literature. The impressive
scholarship well serves Spar's goal of sparking conversation and public
debate. But precisely because Spar's description of the ways in which
the market shapes the acquisition of children in the United States is so
powerful, I hope that she will return to this topic, and say what aspects
of the baby business she thinks properly belong in the market, and
8 Id. at 224.
19 Id.

at 225.
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which ones do not. And if, as I suspect, she is ambivalent about the
adequacy of market language and mechanisms to provide a morally
acceptable basis for family formation, I hope she will confront and
explore that ambivalence. I would welcome a sequel to The Baby
Market that boldly takes up the analysis where this one leaves off,
discussing in greater detail the adequacy of market mechanisms to
regulate family formation in a humane and liberal society, and then the
principles that should guide specific regulations.

